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Reformatted/Re-fleshed
Gender, the Internet and New Configurations
for Embodiment
Kylan Rice

Internet dating websites like OKCupid, eHarmony, and
Match.com, among many others, offer users relative control over the infinite
(and sometimes cosmic) variables involved with initiating a significant and
intimate relationship. Location and proximity are no longer issues, and often
the body itself is a minor factor in determining the parameters of the romantic
encounter. Indeed, internet dating (which has, ideally, a face-to-face, embodied
meeting as its endpoint) exemplifies how corporeality functions differently
online—and how paradigms associated with corporeality and embodiment have
fundamentally changed in its wake. In “Life beyond the screen: embodiment
and identity through the internet,” Michael Hardey suggests that online social
interactions upset “the interaction order” which tends to dominate “face-toface” relations of copresence (571). Hardey offers, for instance, the story of an
internet dater named John, confined to a wheelchair, as an example of this
phenomenon. John writes: “in my experience women find it difficult to get
beyond the chair if they don’t know you and you just meet casually . . . Now
I hold off a little before I explain about the accident . . . [the system] allows
me to decide when to reveal this aspect of my life which I don’t want potential
girlfriends to see as the thing that defines me” (577). Here, the internet dating
profile has allowed John to regulate his image by “removing the immediacy of
bodily disability” (577). For John, virtual interaction will eventually transition

criterion

into a physical copresence, but, leading up to this encounter, the internet dating
website has facilitated here a kind of identity curation. John has redesigned the
previously physicalized “interaction order” and exercised a degree of augmented
control over the formulation of his own identity as it manifests itself in body
and in text. Hardey concludes that “the domain of internet dating is a space in
which individuals seek to close the gap between embodied and disembodied
self, the public and the private individual, and anonymity and intimacy” (579).
In other words, in this instance, the written, textual, virtual body becomes a
lived extension of physical corporeality; it could be said to create more body or
broader bodies. The internet refreshes the individual and reconfigures how the
body represents, manifests, or signifies itself.
Clearly this bears significant ramifications for feminist and postfeminist
thinkers who seek to challenge traditional formulations of identity and
representation in terms of gender and embodiment. The posthuman statuses
made possible by digital technology and the internet/Web 2.0 (as exemplified,
in part, by the internet dating website) appear to open up new spaces for
genderless, even self-describing subjects to exist and to flourish. However,
at this crossroads of posthumanism, cyberfeminism, and digital discourse,
embodiment is often overlooked, reduced, or abstracted—a phenomenon which
ignores the new methods by which digital and virtual contexts can facilitate
fresh evaluations of the body in reality as a potentially liberated surface. Indeed,
discussions surrounding the internet and virtual lifestyles trend toward and
even celebrate erasures of corporeality, using the same kind of mind-body
caesura employed by de la Barre nearly 400 years ago. However, new thought in
the fields of posthuman studies, social media theory, and glitch theory help to
resituate and vindicate investigations of gendered identity initiated by Monique
Wittig and Judith Butler, who critique dualistic prescriptions of gendered
identities and explore what the body looks like as well as how the embodied
subject may represent itself beyond categories of gender. Likewise, rather
than disembodying, digital spaces allow cyberfeminists to access transgressive,
transformative, and augmented corporealities, which in turn allow scholars
to explore how subjectivity might transcend socially preformatted sexual and
biological identities.
In the late seventeenth century, Poulain de la Barre made the Cartesian
assertion that “the mind has no sex”—a statement that helped to disembody
the gendered subject for hundreds of years, if the subject is conceived of as
an esprit du corps, instead of an ontological yoking of mind and body. Indeed,
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since writers like de la Barre and Descartes, the Western world has sought to
perpetuate the caesura between mind and corporeality, occasionally in defense
of feminist agendas. Take, for instance, sentiments expressed by Sadie Plant,
who “envisions the internet as a feminist and impartial setting in which ‘access
to resources’ that ‘were once restricted to those with the right face, accent, race,
sex are now accessible to everyone” (White 605). Indeed, in carefully self-curated
online environments, user photos, avatars, edit options, and other “unbiased,
empowering technological tools” (White 606) have allowed for a disembodied,
posthuman identity politics to develop. However, this approach fails to entirely
account for AFK (away from keyboard) / IRL (in real life) states, the body itself,
or how this genderless, raceless, virtual space can be transposed meaningfully
onto corporeality. Cartesian ruptures celebrated by some digital thinkers
ultimately continue to entrap the subject and fail to address the productive and
“fluid materialities” or forms of embodiment offered by new media.
Indeed, dualistic impulses and agendas continue to spring from Cartesian
headwaters and ripple through all levels of society, conserved specifically in
languages, both daily and digital. Even where computer code and computer
culture are concerned, Anna Munster notes that “familiarity with the legacy
of Cartesian ontology and post-Cartesian rationalism within the knowledge
systems that have informed the rise of computation reveals that there is little
place for the body within computational spaces” (3). Munster questions this
“Cartesian schema” as a compromised paradigm which has led to the birth of
a digital culture largely “shaped via binary logic” (3). Reductionism aside, this
kind of binary logic or digital dualism, instead of freeing the subject, serves
actually to subjugate and to contain, to reify and to perpetuate harmful offline
social configurations. In “Digital Dualism and the Fallacy of Web Objectivity,”
Nathan Jurgenson asserts that the digital dualist “assumption that the on and
offline are separate,” that online ontology is a kind of Janus-faced state, is a
fallacy that ultimately springs from “a bunch of (mostly) white males claiming
to create a digital space somehow separate from their own socialization.” Indeed,
for Jurgenson as well as Legacy Russell, the “mind-body” caesura (or rather, the
IRL / real life divide encouraged by visions of a virtual utopia) ultimately fails to
render a flat or objective subjectivity—or rather, a state in which “the internet
has the power to transcend and remove social locatedness” (“Fallacy”). In other
words, as long as a digital dualism reflective of de le Barre or Descartes’s model
exists, there cannot be a “possible deconstruction of dominant and oppressive
social categorizations such as gender, race, age, and even species (“Fallacy”).
87

criterion

Russell joins in the offensive by acknowledging “that the rigidity of digital
dualism needs to be retired, as it plays into binaries of real/virtual that parallel
the rampantly socialized figuration of male/female” (“Glitch Feminim”).
Exploring the syntactical stakes even further, Jurgenson notes that “Lawrence
Lessig, Saskia Sassen, and many other have demonstrated that computer code
itself, that ultimate symbol of inhuman, logical neutrality, is embodied, social,
historical, and reflects specific value judgments” (“Fallacy”). Reminiscent of
Cixous, Irigaray, Gilbert, and Gubar, who each critiqued the phallocentricity
of language, computer dialects also remain imperfect, non-neutral modes of
expression, compromised by oppressive paradigms. Rather than offering a way
out of the oppressed subject, when digital culture is informed by the same
kind of Cartesian logic put forward by de la Barre, it may actually entrap and
condemn the subject to old forms of social figurations.
Throughout her career, and especially in her essay, “One is Not Born a
Woman,” Monique Wittig rejects this kind of dualism, too, and envisions new
forms of embodiment, which are facilitated today by new media. Wittig, of
course, seeks in her writing to “lesbianize” society, though, for her, the lesbian
operates less as a sexual standard and more as a bricoleur. As a marginal subject,
the lesbian exists outside normal and normative systems of representation and
subjection. The lesbian “refuses dualism and gains an ‘axis of categorization
from which to universalize’” (Farwell 115). Marilyn Farwell notes that by focusing
on the displaced subject and by methodizing this displacement, Wittig “puts
the subject ‘outside of the presence/absence and center/margin dichotomies”
(115), allowing, ultimately, no specific identity, nor recognizable point of view
within the system of heteronormativity. In other words, the lesbian revises
subjectivity. By “universalizing,” the new “imagination posited by this eroticism
leads the [subject] to burst the bonds of recognizable sexual imagery and forge a
textuality/sexuality of her own, with its own reality and language” (Farwell 116).
Farwell goes on to state that “to be outside the dichotomies, undomesticated
and uncategorized [is] to create new images, new languages, and a new axis
of categorization” (116). This impulse becomes valuable in an effort to redefine
what the body means outside of sexual or gendered standards. Today, Wittig’s
project is carried out online and by digital technologies, which fulfill the
function of the lesbian by expanding or universalizing the subject.
First, however, to emphasize: neither can the subject be liberated via
so-called digital escapism or digital dualism, nor can the subject be liberated
solely through disembodied online interactions or states of being. Jurgenson
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suggests that digital ontology “done right” augments rather than replaces.
In other words, recalling posthumanist cyborg discourse, internet spaces
may function as add-ons or “plug-ins” to corporeality, offering “corporeal
transgression . . . through a set of tangible, albeit fluid materialities” (White
605). Is it possible that digital and internet technology might serve to re-embody
or re-flesh? How can the internet perpetuate Wittig’s project for re-acquiring
the subject? How does a “universalized” subject facilitate fluid or diffuse states
of embodiment? To be sure, discussing the body in terms of “fluidity” seems
to preference perceived identity over embodiment, though a cyberfeminist
model of bodily diffusion is not the same as disembodiment per se. Rather,
posthumanist theorists argue that consciousness can be technologically moved
or relocated, an arrangement where “the body is a prosthesis for consciousness,
characterized as more of a tool that can be improved, reconfigured, and quite
possibly shed for a better one” (Miccoli 2). While the term “prosthesis” plays
into the trap of digital dualism by subordinating the body, the sentiment
behind the idea that body and consciousness operate fluidly is key in order to
reconceptualize embodied subjectivity in the digital age. Indeed, it is important
to redefine embodiment proper as either a “process rather than a stable state” or
“lived, fluid,” and contingent or situational (Miccoli 3). It is more helpful to talk
about digital spaces in terms of temporality rather than spatiality—in terms of
events, encounter, and interface, which is precisely the moment that objects
interact with each other, causing either new sensitivities to embodiment or at
least new configurations of embodiment.
When digital dualism is overcome, these kinds of technological and
interfacable events and encounters actually function to minimize reductive
definitions of the body, diffusing it and multiplying it in both on and offline
spaces. Here, Joan Key adopts theoretical frameworks offered by Gilles Deleuze,
arguing that the linked, interconnected, and networked nature of digital
stasis is congenial to Deleuze’s conception of the fold or of folding. Key writes
that “folding breaks down categorizations and the subject positions that rely
on such oppositions as the ‘included and the excluded, the abject and the
desirable, the obscene and the seen’” (White 610). If on- and offline life are
not separate, if they are somehow interwoven, overlapping, or nested within
each other, then the physics of the fold makes some visual sense, offering a
conception of digital embodiment which is “shifting” and “fragmented” and
“resists distinctions between subjects and objects and cohesive positions”
(White 611). Further cementing the concept that on- and offline interplay can
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best be addressed in terms of event or contingency, Bruno Latour’s model for
object-oriented ontology states that “nothing is by itself ordered or disordered,
unique or multiple, homogeneous or heterogeneous, fluid or inert, human
or inhuman, useful or useless. Never by itself, but always by others” (Miller
56). Latour’s model (for ontology and even—by extension—for corporeality)
resists reduction and instead argues that being is based on “local constructions,”
where objects engage in folding or in “concatenating, relating, networking,
negotiating, compromising, and composing” (Miller 20). By transposing Latour
and Deleuze into digital and posthuman contexts, the embodied, corporeal
subject becomes through interface—that is, by folding and networking.
Moreover, through digital augmentation as outlined by Jurgenson, the body is
also opened to new ontological possibilities, new subjectivities.
This phenomenon of (technological) extension is conceptualized at length
by Judith Butler in an essay in direct conversation with Monique Wittig. Butler
throws her shoulder behind Wittig in a discussion on “the existential doctrine
of choice” (505), suggesting that Wittig’s theory of gender functions as a site
where “gender becomes the corporeal locus of cultural meanings both received
and innovated . . . and ‘choice’ in this context comes to signify a corporeal
process of interpretation within a network of deeply entrenched culture norms”
(506). Butler uses Sartre to supplement her reading of Wittig. Butler elaborates
on the “cultural process of interpretation within a network,” writing that “the
body is coextensive with personal identity, . . . [suggesting] that consciousness
is in some sense beyond the body” (508). While this, at first glance, seems
to reify mind/body dualism, Butler writes that “we need to understand this
self-transcendence as itself a corporeal movement, and thus rethink both our
usual ideas of ‘transcendence’ and of mind/body dualism itself” (508). Most
importantly, however, Butler elaborates that “one may surpass the body, but this
does not mean that one definitely gets beyond the body,” and “the body is not a
static or self-identical phenomenon, but a mode of intentionality, a directional
force and mode of desire . . . a mode of becoming” (509). While Butler and
Wittig may not have been writing with digital or technological ends in mind,
their perspectives nevertheless presage posthuman claims that technology may
serve not only to extend corporeality but also to verify embodiment as a process
of becoming—a concept made manifest specifically during moments of folding
or interface, when the body concatenates with objects of technology.
And this moment of interface is the moment of expanded or extended
corporeality. Anthony Miccoli writes that “datafying the self” does not eliminate
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problems associated with embodiment nor does it eliminate the “Cartesian fear
of annihilation” (6). In other words, and as expressed by Butler in terms of Wittig
in 1986, extended corporeality is “not a question of leaving the body behind,
but rather of extending embodied awareness in highly specific, local, and
material ways that would be impossible without electronic prosthesis” (Miccoli
6). However, by understanding the embodied possibilities opened up by digital
ontology, critics like N. Kathleen Hayles believes that posthumanists, digital
humanists, and cyberfeminists can start addressing how incorporation, or,
perhaps more precisely for the purposes of this argument, how re-incorporation
takes place (Miccoli 7). Extended corporeality is less a push-button effect that
the digital has on the real and instead more of a paradigm that can liberate
attitudes held toward IRL subjectivity. Before discussing how this paradigm can
be used or has been used to liberate the subject or to expand the potentiality
of the subject, or how past feminists have operated in this way, it is important
to understand how interface is conceived in a posthuman setting. Anthony
Miccoli argues that “what posthumaninsm avoids addressing is the very need
for connection, as well as the site of interface where connection takes place” (8).
Of course, under consideration the moment of interface becomes the moment
of embodiment, relationality, and digital diffusion.
Using arguments put forward by Elaine Scarry, Miccoli articulates how this
moment of connection or interface is productive in re-embodying the subject or
expanding the parameters and definitions of the embodied subject. Miccoli and
Scarry argue that “technology is not a means to achieve some kind of improved
embodiedness, instead, it is a means by which ‘a bodily attribute is projected
into an artifact which essentially takes on the work of the body, thereby freeing
the embodied person of discomfort and thus enabling him to enter a larger
realm of self- extension” (10). Miccoli suggests that at the moment of interface
(“a palpable surface across which ‘the interior act and exterior object becomes
continuous’”) “technology allows the internal to be expressed in the outside
world” (10). It is useful here to graft in claims set forward by glitch theorists
like Rosa Menkman, who explore the concept of interface and moments when
users become aware of interface (and thus aware of relationality and bodily
diffusion) through glitch or bugginess. In The Glitch Moment(um), Menkman
asserts that in digital media “innovation is . . . still assumed to lie in finding an
interface that is as non-interfering as possible, enabling the audience to forget
about the presence of the medium and believe in the presence and directness
of immediate transmission” (14). However, when a glitch appears in a computer
91
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or technological system it “fosters a critical potential . . . and captures the
machine revealing itself” (Menkman 30). She writes that “when a supposedly
transparent interface is damaged [by a glitch], the viewer is momentarily
relocated to a void of meaning” (30), and the computer itself “suddenly appears
unconventionally deep, in contrast to the more banal, predictable surface-level
behaviors of normal machines and systems” (31). If the moment of interface is a
moment of awareness, then the glitch aids in catalyzing this self-consciousness.
A glitch becomes a way of embodying by rupturing an otherwise transparent,
thoughtless, and disembodied connection between the individual and the
technological artifact.
This idea remains relatively abstract until it is imported as a model into
digital discourse and gender, interrogating how a glitch might manifest itself
in social, gendered systems, or situations. In “One is Not Born a Woman,”
Monique Wittig outlines a useful way of thinking about certain identities as
explosive to normal perceptions of gender or the heterosexual matrix. In effect,
Wittig offers the lesbian as a kind of glitch to this matrix, “a not-woman, a notman,” who, by refusing the role of the woman, allows for a “new personal and
subjective definition for all humankind . . . beyond the categories of sex (man
and woman)” (362). If the lesbian interrupts woman’s “specific social relation
to man” within a heterosexual matrix, living beyond the categories of sex, then
the lesbian effectively meets Wittig’s call for “the advent of individual subjects
which first demands destroying the categories of sex, ending the use of them,
and rejecting all sciences which still use these categories as their fundamentals”
(365). In other words, the lesbian, like a glitch, reveals the inner workings of
the system or matrix and the moment of interface with this system. By doing
so, the lesbian diffuses categories of embodiment and allows for subjective
“self-extension.” In digital contexts, this can also occur when the subject logs
in online and adopts “modes of virtual embodiment that fundamentally
subvert [traditional] identities by more fully utilizing the potential of virtual
technologies to disrupt the expressive or one-to-one-mapping of social
identities and meanings onto bodies” (Vint “Funk Not Punk” ). Interface with a
computer, functional or malfunctioning, facilitates new ways of perceiving the
body in offline states by re-envisioning how the subject represents itself.
Restated differently, augmented reality, as facilitated by URL ontology,
expands and extends corporeality when it allows the subject to take on new
signifiers or represent itself and the body in new ways. In Gender Trouble,
Judith Butler writes at length on the nature of subjectivity and representation,
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arguing that, as representation occurs within a system and secondary to that
system, representation for (female) subjects is necessarily problematized if
“the feminist subject turns out to be discursively constituted by the very political
system that is supposed to facilitate its emancipation” (4). If embodiment is
context based upon representation, this kind of systemic corruption reveals
the problems associated with “liberating” the so-called subject, even online.
Nevertheless, Butler acknowledges the diffuse nature of modern identity and
modern “womanhood,” writing that, “because gender intersects with racial,
class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities of discursively constituted
identities . . . it becomes impossible to separate out ‘gender’ from political and
cultural intersections in which it is invariably produced and maintained” (6).
Butler goes on to problematize universal feminism and universal patriarchy,
maintaining instead a principle of irreduction, showing the subject must remain
a diffuse and diffused entity. In online contexts, representation is not infinitely
liberated but is rather expanded or extended. Indeed, according to Jurgenson
and Butler, the ways in which people express themselves online remain, in some
ways, entrapped by offline, IRL social structures, or even by digital systems
themselves. However, “radical rethinking of the ontological constructions of
identity” (Butler 8) based in mobilizing identity remains the primary goal of
a posthuman, cyberfeminist ontology. The mobile identity is an exercise in
self-identification and self-representation—modes of self-expression that are
facilitated by online posturing, profiles, accounts, platforms, and blogs.
In The Mirror and the Veil, Viviane Serfaty discusses the old digital dream
of reframing (or dismantling) the body into an “immaterial signifier,” a site at
which “corporeity seemingly dissolves and boils down into a set of linguistic
signs” (101), into a body-as-text. However, if we recall writers like Hélène Cixous,
the body-as-text (which can be edited and reframed and utterly controlled
by the user or the subject) is not necessarily disembodied. For Cixous, the
act of writing not only closely parallels embodiment, it also facilitates new
bodies. Cixous argues that a woman must “write her self,” in order to catalyze
“indispensable ruptures and transformations in her history,” articulating her
own femininity, and, as a result, “return to the body which has been more
than confiscated from her, which has been turned into the uncanny stranger
on display” (323). Cixous equates a censoring of the body with the censoring
of speech. In other words, the very act of articulating is an act of setting up
new, self-defined parameters of engenderment. If we consider contemporary
discourse surrounding the narcissism of a plugged-in Generation X, Cixous
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argues, tellingly, that as men have censored women, “they have made for
women an antinarcissism” (322). Likewise, the online text (in the form of a
blog or microblog post) is fundamentally narcissistic in that it preens—since
the online text can be edited continuously, the subject/user has, at all levels,
the power to design, shape, and encode itself in text; therefore, the online text
shifts in the mirror. Cixous argues that a new feminine discourse functions
not only to “break up, to destroy” but also to “foresee” and “project” (319). A
new feminine discourse not only embodies but also specifically embodies
new, speculative bodies—or, rather, bodies that exist in process and are able
to be edited, expanded, copied, and pasted. Online corporeality, facilitated
by the body-as-text model, allows the user and the user’s body a speculative
diffuseness, extension, and recombinatory nature.
Current trends and innovations in social media technology facilitate similar
paradigms that encourage diffuse, recombinatory, and extended identity.
Social media theorists like Jurgenson critique current configurations of the
online identity profile, offering a “liquid” or “fluid” self in place of the rigidly
defined and outlined identity made possible by self-curated photos, quotes,
posts, and likes or dislikes. While Jurgenson principally believes that the
internet (including a variety of social media platforms) constructs an expanded
identity, he also suggests in an article entitled “The Liquid Self,” that the ideal
social media profile should not “ask us to work ourselves into as many identitycontainers, given the fact that humans and identity itself are fundamentally
fluid and ever changing.” Indeed, Jurgenson calls to mind the critical work of
Walter Pater, who described human identity as a “hard gem-like flame,” both
fluctuating and indelible simultaneously. Jurgenson offers an updated vision of
the social media profile, writing that “dominant social media has thus far taken
a stand . . . for a version of identity that is highly categorized and omnipresent,
one that forces an ideal of a singular stable identity that we will continuously
have to confront” (“The Liquid Self”). He argues that a “temporary social media
will provide new ways of understanding the social media profile, one that isn’t
comprised of life hacked into frozen, quantifiable pieces by instead something
more fluid, changing, and alive” (“The Liquid Self”). Of course, Jurgenson’s
claims need not stand in conflict with those previously outlined in this essay—
digital platforms and profiles still offer individuals profound control over selfexpression—but they nevertheless provide progressive insight into how social
media and “authentic” identity can be reconciled. Again, this evidence is meant
to show that the internet can offer new ways of representing the subject, à la
94
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Butler and Wittig, and that these new ways can be ported into offline bodies
and ontologies.
Perhaps one way of conceptualizing this porting or the relationship between
internet augmented reality and real issues of embodiment is to examine ways in
which expanded consciousness has helped the individual to rethink or re-flesh
the body—both in the past and in a non-digital context. Gloria Anzaldúa
outlines a cosmopolitan paradigm for self-identification, raising questions on
how intersectional identities can contribute to a “mestiza consciousness,” or,
rather, a consciousness “of the Borderlands,” which reflects a “hybrid progeny,
a mutable, more malleable species with a rich gene pool” (386). For Anzaldúa,
a mestiza consciousness is rooted in multiculturalism, even multiracialism,
but has a direct impact on the psyche and the paradigms of the mind. In other
words, mind and body interface or interfere with one another, bound up in a
relationship where one informs the other. She writes that “mestiza copes by
developing a tolerance for contradictions, a tolerance for ambiguity . . . and
breaks down the subject-object duality that keeps [woman] a prisoner” (388).
This paradigm correlates with “a massive uprooting of dualistic thinking in the
individual and collective consciousness—the beginning of a long struggle, but
one that could . . . bring us to the end of rape, of violence, of war” (389). In other
words, Anzaldúa believes that by destroying dualities of being, by opening the
subject to fluidity, contingency, and ambiguity, the subject and the body can
be freed from real violence. A mestiza consciousness not only defies duality,
but it also is an example of the ways in which paradigms and embodiment (or
here, genealogy) intersect. From Anzaldúa, it is possible to extrapolate how
expanded forms of identity, self-identification, reality, and corporeality can
have real effects on real embodiment.
Rethinking the internet, digital technology, and digital culture in terms
laid out initially by Wittig and Butler, and later expanded upon by thinkers
like Miccoli and Jurgenson, shows that because online life overlaps with the
IRL, new configurations of “personality” online can inform how identity can
be manifested or expressed by the body. New paradigms regarding being and
personality facilitated by the internet harmonize with a sentiment expressed by
Jean- Paul Sartre in Being and Nothingness: that is, we “do not exist all at once”
(352). Returning to the anecdote offered earlier in this essay, Sartre, in discussing
his own corporeality and real disabilities, writes that “even this disability from
which I suffer I have assumed by the very fact that I live; I surpass it toward my
own projects, I make of it the necessary obstacle for my being, and I cannot
95
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be crippled without choosing myself as crippled” (352). Sartre’s vision of the
“body-surpassed”—using models of surpassing (augmented) embodiment—
align with similar conceptions of extended corporeality offered in internet
borderlands. As a result, Sartre’s vision readjusts how the body—including the
crippled bodies of Sartre or the internet dating services user—can be revised or
readjusted after the internet rehauls how people conceive of embodiment on a
day-to-day basis. From glitch to blog writing, the internet helps to interrogate
what embodiment means in a posthuman state and how individuals or users
can expand on Monique Wittig’s project to offer new personal and subjective
definitions of mankind—definitions that exist beyond gender but not necessarily
beyond the body. The internet establishes a new mestiza consciousness, or the
so-called Borderlands consciousness, where border is here synonymous with
interface, a surface that folds and erupts, allowing the embodied individuals to
transgress or transform traditional versions of corporeality.
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